JUNE 2, 2017, 8:49 AM| Award-winning author Michael Ruhlman has been writing about food for 20 years. [Got food?] He’s collaborated with professional chefs on cookbooks and written about the basics of cooking. Ruhlman joins “CBS This Morning” to discuss his new book, “Grocery: The Buying and Selling of Food in America” and how our relationship with food has evolved.
Video [4:30] embedded at the link:
In Grocery, bestselling author Michael Ruhlman offers incisive commentary on America’s relationship with its food and investigates the overlooked source of so much of it—the grocery store.
In a culture obsessed with food—how it looks, what it tastes like, where it comes from, what is good for us—there are often more questions than answers.
From July 2016, here is a lengthy, detailed and superb down loadable publication by a sales and marketing powerhouse entitled “the revolution of grocery shopping”:
Societal shifts, technology advances and major transformations in lifestyle are forcing evolution.
From December 2016, ten paragraphs:
A Quick History of the Supermarket
Chain grocery retailing was a phenomenon that took off around the beginning of the twentieth century, with the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (established 1859) and other small, regional players. Grocery stores of this era tended to be small (generally less than a thousand square feet) and also focused on only one aspect of food retailing. Grocers (and most of the chains fell into this camp) sold what is known as “dry grocery” items, or canned goods and other non-perishable staples. Butchers and greengrocers (produce vendors) were completely separate entities, although they tended to cluster together for convenience’s sake.
Clarence Saunders’ Piggly Wiggly stores, established in Memphis in 1916, are widely credited with introducing America to self-service shopping, although other stores (notably Alpha Beta in Southern California) around the country were experimenting with the idea at about the same time. Self-service stores came to be known as “groceterias” due to the fact that they were reminiscent of the cafeteria-style eateries that were gaining popularity at the time.
The Chain Store Explosion (1920s):
It was not until the 1920s that chain stores started to become a really dominant force in American food (and other) retailing. Small regional chains such as Kroger, American Stores, National Tea, and others began covering more and more territory, and A&P began moving toward a more national profile, operating over 10,000 of its “economy stores” by the end of the decade. Most of these stores remained small, counter service stores, often staffed by only two or three employees, with no meat nor produce departments. Some still offered delivery and charge accounts, although most chain stores had abandoned these practices.
In 1926, Charles Merrill, of Merrill Lynch set in motion a series of transactions that led to the creation of Safeway Stores, when he arranged the merger of Skaggs Cash Stores, a chain with operations in Northern California and the northwestern United States, with Los Angeles-based Sam Seelig Stores. In 1928, the new chain bought most of the west coast’s Piggly Wiggly stores, and later acquired Sanitary Stores in the Washington DC area as well as MacMarr Stores, another chain that Charles Merrill had assembled. Growth by merger became common in the late 1920s and 1930s, and led to numerous antitrust actions and attempts to tax the chain stores out of existence.
The Supermarket (1930s and 1940s):
As early at the 1920s, some chain grocers were experimenting with consolidated (albeit still rather small) stores that featured at least a small selection of fresh meats and produce along with the dry grocery items. In Southern California, Ralphs Grocery Company was expanding into much larger stores than had been seen before in most of the country. Los Angeles was also seeing the beginning of the “drive-in market” phenomenon, where several complimentary food retailers (a butcher, a baker, a grocer, and a produce vendor, for example) would locate within the same small shopping center surrounding a parking lot. These centers were often perceived by customers as a single entity, despite being under separate ownership.
In 1930, Michael Cullen, a former executive of both Kroger and A&P, opened his first King Kullen store, widely cited as America’s first supermarket, although others have some legitimate claim to that title as well. King Kullen was located in a warehouse on the fringes of New York City, and offered ample free parking and additional concessions in a bazaar-like atmosphere. Merchandise was sold out of packing cartons and little attention was paid to décor. The emphasis was on volume, with this one store projected to do the volume of up to one hundred conventional chain stores. The volume and the no frills approach resulted in considerably lower prices.
The supermarket, as it came to be known, was initially a phenomenon of independents and small, regional chains. Eventually, the large chains caught on as well, and they refined the concept, adding a level of sophistication that had been lacking from the spartan stores of the early 1930s. In the late 1930s, A&P began consolidating its thousands of small service stores into larger supermarkets, often replacing as many as five or six stores with one large, new one. By 1940, A&P’s store count had been reduced by half, but its sales were up. Similar transformations occurred among all the “majors”; in fact, most national chains of the time saw their store counts peak around 1935 and then decline sharply through consolidation. Most chains operated both supermarkets and some old-style stores simultaneously for the next decade or so, either under the same name (like Safeway, A&P, and Kroger) , or under different banners (such as the Big Star stores operated by the David Pender Grocery Company in the southeast).
Suburbs and Shopping Centers (1950s and 1960s):
By the 1950s, the transition to supermarkets was largely complete, and the migration to suburban locations was beginning. Some chains were more aggressive with this move than others. A&P, for example, was very hesitant to expend the necessary capital and move outward, retaining smaller, outdated, urban locations for perhaps longer than was prudent. While the company tried to catch up in the 1960s, its momentum had vanished, and the once dominant chain eventually became something of an “also-ran.”
The 1950s and 1960s were seen my many as the golden age of the supermarket, with bright new stores opening on a regular basis, generating excited and glowing newspaper reports, and serving a marketplace that was increasingly affluent. Standardized designs, in use since the 1930s and 1940s, were refined and modernized, creating instantly recognizable and iconic buildings such as A&P’s colonial-themed stores; the glass arch-shaped designs of Safeway, Penn Fruit, and others; and the towering pylon signs of Food Fair and Lucky Stores.
Discounters and Warehouse Stores (1970s):
As changing tastes and zoning boards forced exteriors to become more “subdued” in the late 1960s, interiors began to compensate, with colorful designs evoking New Orleans or the “Gay 90s” or old farmhouses replacing the stark whites common to many stores of the 1950s. Other new touches included carpeting, specialty departments, and more. Kroger’s new “superstore” prototype, introduced in 1972, was perhaps the peak of this trend, with its specialty departments and its orange, gold, and green color palette.
Many shoppers, however, wondered what the costs of these amenities might be, and something of a backlash developed. This backlash was answered in the late 1960s with a new trend known as “discounting.”
Numerous stores around the country embarked on discounting programs at about the same time, most of which centered around the elimination of trading stamps, reduction in operating hours, and an emphasis on cost-cutting. Lucky Stores of California simply re-imaged their current stores and kept using the same name, while others opted for a hybrid format, with some stores operating traditionally and others (such as Colonial’s Big Star stores and Harris Teeter’s More Value in the southeast) open as discounters under different names.
A&P, as was its custom at the time, arrived somewhat late and unprepared for this party. It attempt at discounting, WEO (Warehouse Economy Outlet) was something of a disaster, plagued by distribution issues and by the fact that its numerous smaller and older stores were not capable of producing the volume required to make discounting work (but were converted anyway). This was one of several factors that preceded A&P’s major meltdown of the mid-1970s.
Upscale Stores, Warehouses, and Mergers (1980s and 1990s):
The market segmentation we see today grew out of the discounting movement as amplified in the 1980s. The middle range began to disappear, albeit slowly, as mainline stores went more “upscale” and low end stores moved more toward a warehouse model, evocative of the early supermarkets of the 1930s. Many chains operated at both ends of the spectrum, often under different names (Edwards and Finast was an example, as were the many A&P brands, from “Futurestore” to “Sav-a-Center”). Others eliminated one end of the market completely, like Harris Teeter in North Carolina, which abandoned discounting entirely.
The re-emergence of superstores, featuring general merchandise and groceries under one roof accelerated this trend. Many such stores had opened in the early 1960s, some of them operated by chain grocers themselves. Only a few survived, Fred Meyer in Oregon being a noteworthy example, and “one stop shopping” seemed a relatively new and fresh idea when Kmart and Walmart tried it again, with considerably more success, starting around 1990.
The other big trend during this time was toward mergers and leveraged buyouts. This affected almost all the major chains. A&P was sold to German interests. Safeway took itself private in 1987 to avoid a hostile takeover, and lost half its geographical reach in the process. Kroger slimmed down somewhat in 1988 for the same reasons, while Lucky was acquired by American Stores the same year. Another round of mergers in the 1990s placed American Stores in the hands of Albertsons, reunited Safeway with much of its former territory, and greatly increased the west coast presence of Kroger, making these three chains the dominant players in the industry, along with Walmart.
All of which brings us to the present, which is not what this site is about, so I’ll leave any further mention of big box retailers, new players like Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s, and subsequent mergers to future historians, and invite you to continue exploring the past at Groceteria.com.
Can the Moby store bring locally controlled convenience stores to places that lack a simple place to buy essentials?
In Shanghai, a prototype of a new 24-hour convenience store has no staff, no registers, and the whole thing is on wheels, designed to eventually drive itself to a warehouse to restock, or to a customer to make a delivery.
The startup behind it believes that it’s the model for the grocery store of the future–and because it’s both mobile and far cheaper to build and operate than a typical store, it could also help bring better access to groceries to food deserts and rural areas.
“The biggest costs to have a store are the place itself to rent in a central city.” [Photo: courtesy Wheelys]
For consumers, it’s designed to be an easier way to shop. To use the store, called Moby, you download an app and use your phone to open the door. A hologram-like AI greets you, and, as you shop, you scan what you want to buy or place it in a smart basket that tracks your purchases. Then you walk out the door; instead of waiting in line, the store automatically charges your card when you leave (Amazon is testing a similar system). The tiny shop will stock fresh food and other daily supplies, and if you want something else you can order it using the store’s artificial intelligence. The packages will be waiting when you return to shop the next time. When autonomous vehicles are allowed on roads, the store could also show up at your home, and the company is also testing a set of drones to make small deliveries.
In a dense urban neighborhood with high rents, the low-cost system could make it possible for a group of neighbors to launch their own local grocery. “The biggest costs to have a store are the place itself to rent in a central city–it’s ultra-expensive–and then staff is really expensive, and we’re removing both of these at the same time,” says Tomas Mazetti, one of the founders of Wheelys, the Sweden-based startup that is developing the store along with China’s Hefei University and Himalayafy, an offshoot of Wheelys focused on the technology inside the store.
Wheelys already makes small mobile coffee carts designed to help young entrepreneurs compete with chains like Starbucks when they don’t have the funds to rent space for a standard cafe. It envisions that its new mobile markets could similarly be purchased and used by almost anyone, anywhere. The company also plans to mass-produce the stores, making them cheaper to build than traditional local construction (the company expects that it may be possible to build a store for $30,000; on top of any markup, store franchisees would also pay a small “community fee” to get support from the company on logistics). Solar panels on top of the store are designed to power the vehicle’s electric motor and all of the equipment and lighting inside.
“Now a village can team up and buy one of these stores. If the village is really small, [the store] can move around to different villages.” [Photo: courtesy Wheelys]
For the startup, the new product seemed like a logical step. Cafe customers were already beginning to ask for larger stores. “Apart from the size, the basic construction is not that much more complex than our biggest mobile cafes,” says Mazetti. “The university provides us with access and a technical edge in some areas such as self-driving tech.” In 2016, the company acquired Näraffär, a Swedish startup with technology for a staff-less store, and a staff-less (but not mobile) store operated in Sweden until the company began the project in Shanghai.
In rural areas and small towns, the design could replace main street stores that have disappeared. “I grew up in the countryside in Northern Sweden,” he says. “The last store closed there in the 1980s sometime, and after that, everyone just commuted into the city, but that takes an hour. A little piece of the village died. Now, suddenly, in a place like that, the village can team up and buy one of these stores. If the village is really small, [the store] can move around to different villages.”
When autonomous vehicles are allowed on roads, the store could also show up at your home. [Photo: courtesy Wheelys]
The system is also designed to restock itself automatically. In a city, one Moby could self-drive to a warehouse to replenish itself while another takes its place (the current model can be controlled remotely or driven by a human; the designers are still finalizing the autonomous technology, and it’s not yet legal for it to drive itself on Chinese roads). Stores could also help replenish each other, avoiding longer trips. “It’s common in stores that one store has run out of milk, another has run out of eggs, but both of them need to have a truck go back and forth to a warehouse,” he says. “We can ship these products in between, so we don’t need to go back and forth these long distances to rural areas to do this.”
While the store has a limited selection, focused on day-to-day needs, the designers think that it represents what’s coming in retail. “I think 7-11 is the store of the future, combined with online retail,” says Mazetti. “There’s no point in the things in between. Because if you need a printer, or a spare part for your vacuum cleaner, or even a turkey, it makes more sense to have that delivered.”
In the beta tests, the company will continue to test the app and staff-less tech in the store, along with online ordering, how consumers merge in-person shopping with digital orders, and other aspects of the shopping experience, such as the fact that only three or four people can fit inside the tiny store at once. It will also test the store’s ability to restock itself (it will be driven to a nearby warehouse; in the future, it will be able to drive itself farther away). The company plans to quickly add more features. “Of course there are many actors on the market with deeper pockets than us, but deep pockets can weigh you down,” says Mazetti says. “We are nimble and fast and have been able to stay ahead in this field for a year. Regardless, someone needs to lead the way, and we’re convinced that this, or a similar system, is the future of retail.”
After the beta tests in Shanghai–a city chosen because it’s a world leader in mobile payments, because Wheelys has an assembly plant ready there, and for its Bladerunner-like futurism–the company will continue to tweak the design. “It feels like we’re building the first car in the world and that it still looks a little like a horse cart,” he says. “I think we need to calibrate stuff, and get some things right, like how many people can be in a store at the same time. And what exactly we should sell–we don’t know that yet. We need to test it more.”
By 2018, Wheelys expects to be ready to produce and sell the stores, and help franchisees compete with other coming retail outlets like Amazon’s new brick-and-mortar stores. “I want these to be bought by families or groups of people, so that it’s not one person that owns every store in the world,” says Mazetti. “Instead of working at a warehouse for Amazon, you can own your own little store.”
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Adele Peters is a staff writer at Fast Company who focuses on solutions to some of the world’s largest problems, from climate change to homelessness. Previously, she worked with GOOD, BioLite, and the Sustainable Products and Solutions program at UC Berkeley. More
By Harry Blazer
How the deal helps Whole Foods and John Mackey:
a) Immediate stock appreciation.
b) Pressure re: their performance (negative store comps and negative trending sales per square foot) and lagging stock price from Private Equity and other shareholders
and market disappears.
c) John Mackey remains as CEO (for now).
d) The only national retailer of organic, natural and specialty (and arguably most well-known and respected brand) just joined forces with the most innovative, disruptive and respected international brand in online retailing – and arguably
retailing in general – not to mention one of the preeminent providers of web services and masters of fulfillment.
e) WF can now operate under the consolidated statement of Amazon (if Amazon chooses to do so) rather than having to report as a separate company and thus escape scrutiny from market and competitors re: financial performance and
f) Expansion of market share overnight by plugging into Amazon Fresh customer base.
g) Able to leverage Amazon expertise as the leader in logistics and fulfillment and one of the most significant players in data services, analytics, online technology and customer interface.
How the deal helps Amazon:
a) Early on I had conversations with Tesco N. American leadership re: their Fresh and Easy concept, which was having trouble almost from the get go. They made a number of critical mistakes (which I tried to point out) with one of the major ones being that they tried to introduce a new retail brand and launch a new concept at the same time in a fairly big way (a concept that to make matters worse was not perceived as either Fresh or Easy by the consumer). They would have been much better off to have acquired a conventional chain with a respected brand and with an
established and viable store base, learned about the differences in doing the supermarket business in the U.S. vs. other places in the world and about the U.S. consumer while leveraging their experience and prominence as conventional supermarket operators, and then used that base from which to develop and launch a new, fresh-convenience concept.
Amazon has been in the beginning stages of developing their grocery business, after a number of years of prototyping. That development has moved slower than they would have liked. Amazon came to understand that the fastest way to become a
major player in the food business was through partnerships and acquisitions – not by building that business internally and incrementally. Amazon has the ability to dominate entire retailing segments by leveraging their brand and IT, customer interface, data analytics and logistics infrastructure. Speed pays dividends – as reflected in their stock price after the WF acquisition – by which they created a larger increase in their valuation than the price they paid for Whole Foods. This shows how the market views the power and potential of this alliance and the leverage it will now bring to Amazon. Conversely, the rest of the industry lost about $40 Billion in market valuation. Equally telling.
b) Wal-Mart became the largest grocer in N. America within a decade of when it made the decision to get involved in groceries. Why did they go after groceries? Because food represents increased shopping frequency over hard and soft goods.
They doubled the frequency of shop at their superstores when they added food. Aldi showed meteoric growth in the UK market when they added fresh and specialty food to their stores. Costco recently surpassed WF to become the largest purveyor
of organic groceries in North America. Amazon believed that by being able to offer food to their customers that it could
increase frequency as well. But just as importantly, food is a critical component in their drive to become the primary shop and first “stop” for every household – for everything!!! They now will enhance their ability to become Wal-Mart before Wal- Mart can become Amazon.
c) Amazon has been prototyping various approaches in their drive to develop their own food retailing channel – predominantly under the “Amazon Fresh” subsidiary – which has gone through several iterations as well. It now has the opportunity to develop a more coherent and comprehensive strategy, offering and branding around food, and unify, clarify and synchronize the food retailing initiatives represented by Amazon fresh, go, pickup, pantry, prime and prime now.
d) When I was working with Morrisons in the UK, I tried to convince them not to try to develop their own home delivery infrastructure to compete with the offerings of
Tesco and Sainsbury that were well established, but to partner with Amazon, who was just entering the non-grocery retail market and was also looking for a quick pathway into groceries as well. After spending substantial time and money trying to
develop a home delivery IT and logistics capability themselves, Morrisons decided to partner with Ocado, who was also supplying delivery services for a competitor (Waitrose). Morrisons paid big money for the privilege as well and missed at the time what was a natural partnership that could have made Morrisons money from the get go with Amazon in charge of home delivery fulfillment and Morrisons as Amazon’s grocery and fresh food supplier – especially since Morrisons, unlike other UK retailers, had an extensive, proprietary food manufacturing and processing
infrastructure of its own, which it maintains today. Several years later, Amazon has become the major force in retailing in the country, and a major factor in food retailing; with Morrisons as a primary supplier . In North America, with the acquisition of Whole Foods, that primary supply partnership has been defined for the future. Perhaps in the UK as well.
e) Whole Foods has about 464 locations (about 5% of which were outside the USA in Canada and UK) with some 90 in development (1/10th of Wal-Mart’s store base).
They also have 11 distribution facilities and 3 seafood processing and distribution facilities and one facility dedicated to specialty coffee. Amazon has over 60 DC’s, undoubtedly more effective than those operated by WF for the distribution of nonperishables
by the piece. Amazon is paying just under $30M per store – most of which are leased by the way, and about 17x WF’s free cash flow. Not unreasonable just as an acquisition price per se – without the strategic considerations.
f) Amazon generates about what it is paying for WF in free cash each year. If it pays cash, it will use about 50% of the value of its current cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities for the purchase. So this represents a significant investment. They are serious about becoming a major player in the food business, fast!
g) Amazon will get an insiders view of UNFI and Instacart – with whom WF currently has strategic and contractual partnerships. It is interesting to contemplate the effect on the industry if Amazon also acquired these organizations.
h) I have often told retailers I have worked with that Google, Facebook and Amazon have much more comprehensive data about their customers than they do. What these players don’t have is the in-store POS transaction data to close the loop. I have
suggested to a number of retailers that they would be much better off partnering with these players than trying to develop their own card-based loyalty program, – players who would be anxious to do so I believe for a look at their transaction data,
if nothing else. We are about to see what happens when one of the premier players in the virtual and data world gets transparency of the transactional data of one of the premier players in the retail food bricks and mortar world.
- The WF shopper demographic is highly skewed to urban, higher income and higher education – naturally synergistic with Amazon’s Prime and Prime variants present and aspiring customer base.
j) Amazon just added 460+ pickup locations overnight.
k) As reported by Becky Shilling re: the recent United Fresh convention in Chicago:
The future of fresh isn’t Amazon. That was the overwhelming sentiment during a panel of Gen Z Chicagoans at United Fresh’s Fresh MKT…. The idea of ordering fresh grocery
food from Amazon did not appeal to these customers, who said they felt food ordered from Amazon Fresh would be “too handled,” “not ripe,” “not the best quality” or “might
The key factor to building a vibrant Fresh business is building trust. Few organizations are regarded more highly by customers than Amazon – but this is mainly around selection, speed and accuracy of delivery, and price. Fresh is a different story. So as much as customers trust Amazon to provide what they want, when, how and where they want it at a price they can afford (often the best in the marketplace), that doesn’t mean they will trust them to be their merchants for Fresh. Whole Foods has had challenges over time with trust factors and vendor relations as
well. But if you can merge the value and fulfillment proposition offered by Amazon with the food credentials of Whole Foods, and make yourself worthy of people’s trust around Fresh (customers and vendors), you can dominate the world of food
retailing. And I think that is the plan – and also the opportunity this merger represents.
And a special comment for Solari subscribers that you probably won’t see elsewhere: It is my personal belief that the major telecom, entertainment and internet powerhouses would not be thriving unless they cooperated with the intelligence agencies as requested and in turn by default, with the Deep State. The Amazon and WF deal represents the first merging of one of the primary providers of IT and data infrastructure for the Deep State and the most highly regarded Fresh, Organic, Natural and Specialty Food retailers of national scope. Gives new meaning to the need to go local, support your local farmer and perhaps grow your own.
“This article recounts key events along a timeline that stretches from 1986 to the present. Follow the bouncing ball.
All sorts of cards can be played from the bottom of the deck.”
When Amazon boss and billionaire Jeff Bezos bought the Washington Post in 2013, he also had an ongoing $600 million contract to provide cloud computing services to the CIA. That meant the Washington Post, which already had a long history of cooperation with the CIA, renewed their wedding vows with the Agency and doubled down on the alliance.
By any reasonable standard of journalism, the Post should preface every article about the CIA, or article sourced from the CIA, with a conflict of interest admission: TAKE THIS PIECE WITH A FEW GIANT GRAINS OF SALT, BECAUSE OUR NEWSPAPER IS OWNED BY A MAN WHO HAS A HUGE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE CIA.
Now Bezos and his company, Amazon, have bought Whole Foods for $13.7 billion. Whole Foods is the premier retailer of “natural” foods in America.
The degree of profiling of Whole Foods customers will increase by a major factor. Amazon/CIA will be able to deploy far more sophisticated algorithms in that regard.
It’s no secret that many Whole Foods customers show disdain for government policies on agribusiness, health, medicine, and the environment. Well, that demographic is of great interest to the Deep State, for obvious reasons. And the Deep State will now be able to analyze these customers in finer detail.
At the same time, the Amazon retail powerhouse will exercise considerable control over the food supply, since it will be selling huge numbers of food products to the public. Amazon will have new relationships with all the farmers Whole Foods has been using as suppliers.
Perhaps this disclaimer posted on every Whole Foods item is now in order: KEEP IN MIND THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF WHOLE FOODS, AMAZON, HAS A VERY TIGHT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIA. USE YOUR IMAGINATION.
Then there is this. The CIA has its own private company, called In-Q-Tel, which was founded in 1999 to pour investment money into tech outfits that could develop new ways to facilitate “data collection,” and service other CIA needs. In-Q-Tel, Jeff Bezos, and Amazon are connected. For example, here is a 2012 article from technologyreview.com:
“Inside a blocky building in a Vancouver suburb, across the street from a dowdy McDonald’s, is a place chilled colder than anywhere in the known universe. Inside that is a computer processor that Amazon founder Jeff Bezos and the CIA’s investment arm, In-Q-Tel, believe can tap the quirks of quantum mechanics to unleash more computing power than any conventional computer chip. Bezos and In-Q-Tel are in a group of investors who are betting $30 million on this prospect…”
Nextgov.com described the deal this way: “Canadian company D-Wave Systems raised $30 million to develop quantum computing systems. Bezos Expeditions, the personal investment company of Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, and CIA venture capital arm In-Q-Tel participated in the latest funding round, the firm announced. The company’s quantum computing technology seeks to speed up data-crunching. If successful, the technology could aid automated intelligence gathering and analysis.”
Yes, automated intelligence gathering and analysis are exactly what outfits like Amazon and the CIA need for profiling the public. Other companies who have purchased products from D-Wave Systems? Goldman Sachs and Lockheed Martin. Let’s see: Amazon, CIA, Goldman, Lockheed—a formidable collection of Deep State players.
“Buy your food from the purest natural retailer in the world, the CIA.
Oops, I mean Amazon.
Oops, I mean Whole Foods.”
Los Angeles Times
around dinnertime GMT-5 Tuesday June 20th, 2017
Amazon.com’s plan to buy Whole Foods Market Inc. sparked an avalanche of discussion about how the online retail giant could transform the U.S.